+
+
+## Exim Konfiguration:
+
+
+### Main
+
+zuerst:
+[[!format txt """
+sudo aptitude install clamav spamassassin spamc greylistd
+
+adduser clamav Debian-exim
+adduser Debian-exim clamav
+"""]]
+/etc/clamav/clamd.conf
+[[!format txt """
+#Automatically Generated by clamav-base postinst
+#To reconfigure clamd run #dpkg-reconfigure clamav-base
+#Please read /usr/share/doc/clamav-base/README.Debian.gz for details
+LocalSocket /var/run/clamav/clamd.ctl
+FixStaleSocket
+User clamav
+AllowSupplementaryGroups
+ScanMail
+ScanArchive
+ArchiveMaxRecursion 5
+ArchiveMaxFiles 1000
+ArchiveMaxFileSize 10M
+ArchiveMaxCompressionRatio 250
+ReadTimeout 180
+MaxThreads 12
+MaxConnectionQueueLength 15
+LogFile /var/log/clamav/clamav.log
+LogTime
+LogFileMaxSize 0
+PidFile /var/run/clamav/clamd.pid
+DatabaseDirectory /var/lib/clamav
+SelfCheck 3600
+ScanOLE2
+ScanPE
+DetectBrokenExecutables
+ScanHTML
+ArchiveBlockMax
+"""]]
+/etc/exim4/conf.d/main/02_exim4-config_options
+[[!format txt """
+### main/02_exim4-config_options
+#################################
+
+av_scanner = clamd:/var/run/clamav/clamd.ctl
+spamd_address = 127.0.0.1 783
+
+...
+"""]]
+/etc/exim4/conf.d/acl/30_exim4-config_check_rcpt
+[[!format txt """
+# This access control list is used for every RCPT command in an incoming
+# SMTP message. The tests are run in order until the address is either
+# accepted or denied.
+#
+acl_check_rcpt:
+
+ # Accept if the source is local SMTP (i.e. not over TCP/IP). We do this by
+ # testing for an empty sending host field.
+ accept hosts = :
+
+ # Add missing Date and Message-ID header for relayed messages
+ warn hosts = +relay_from_hosts
+ control = submission/sender_retain
+
+ # The following section of the ACL is concerned with local parts that contain
+ # @ or % or ! or / or | or dots in unusual places.
+ #
+ # The characters other than dots are rarely found in genuine local parts, but
+ # are often tried by people looking to circumvent relaying restrictions.
+ # Therefore, although they are valid in local parts, these rules lock them
+ # out, as a precaution.
+ #
+ # Empty components (two dots in a row) are not valid in RFC 2822, but Exim
+ # allows them because they have been encountered. (Consider local parts
+ # constructed as "firstinitial.secondinitial.familyname" when applied to
+ # someone like me, who has no second initial.) However, a local part starting
+ # with a dot or containing /../ can cause trouble if it is used as part of a
+ # file name (e.g. for a mailing list). This is also true for local parts that
+ # contain slashes. A pipe symbol can also be troublesome if the local part is
+ # incorporated unthinkingly into a shell command line.
+ #
+ # Two different rules are used. The first one is stricter, and is applied to
+ # messages that are addressed to one of the local domains handled by this
+ # host. It blocks local parts that begin with a dot or contain @ % ! / or |.
+ # If you have local accounts that include these characters, you will have to
+ # modify this rule.
+ deny domains = +local_domains
+ local_parts = ^[.] : ^.*[@%!/|\'`#&?]
+ message = restricted characters in address
+
+ # The second rule applies to all other domains, and is less strict. This
+ # allows your own users to send outgoing messages to sites that use slashes
+ # and vertical bars in their local parts. It blocks local parts that begin
+ # with a dot, slash, or vertical bar, but allows these characters within the
+ # local part. However, the sequence /../ is barred. The use of @ % and ! is
+ # blocked, as before. The motivation here is to prevent your users (or
+ # your users' viruses) from mounting certain kinds of attack on remote sites.
+
+ deny domains = !+local_domains
+ local_parts = ^[./|] : ^.*[@%!\'`#&?] : ^.*/\\.\\./
+ message = restricted characters in address
+
+ # Accept mail to postmaster in any local domain, regardless of the source,
+ # and without verifying the sender.
+ #
+ accept local_parts = postmaster
+ domains = +local_domains
+
+ # deny bad senders (envelope sender)
+ # CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist holds a list of envelope senders that
+ # should have their access denied to the local host. Incoming messages
+ # with one of these senders are rejected at RCPT time.
+ #
+ # The explicit white lists are honored as well as negative items in
+ # the black list. See /usr/share/doc/exim4-config/default_acl for details.
+ deny message = sender envelope address $sender_address is locally blacklisted here. If you think this is wrong, get in touch with postmaster
+ !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist}\
+ {CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist}\
+ {}}
+
+ # deny bad sites (IP address)
+ # CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist holds a list of host names, IP addresses
+ # and networks (CIDR notation) that should have their access denied to
+ # The local host. Messages coming in from a listed host will have all
+ # RCPT statements rejected.
+ #
+ # The explicit white lists are honored as well as negative items in
+ # the black list. See /usr/share/doc/exim4-config/default_acl for details.
+ deny message = sender IP address $sender_host_address is locally blacklisted here. If you think this is wrong, get in touch with postmaster
+ !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ hosts = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist}\
+ {CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist}\
+ {}}
+
+
+
+ # Deny unless the sender address can be verified.
+ #
+ # This is disabled by default so that DNSless systems don't break. If
+ # your system can do DNS lookups without delay or cost, you might want
+ # to enable the following line.
+ #deny message = Sender verification failed
+ # !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ # !verify = sender
+
+ # Warn if the sender host does not have valid reverse DNS.
+ #
+ # This is disabled by default so that DNSless systems don't break. If
+ # your system can do DNS lookups without delay or cost, you might want
+ # to enable the following lines.
+ # If sender_host_address is defined, it's a remote call. If
+ # sender_host_name is not defined, then reverse lookup failed. Use
+ # this instead of !verify = reverse_host_lookup to catch deferrals
+ # as well as outright failures.
+ warn message = X-Host-Lookup-Failed: Reverse DNS lookup failed for $sender_host_address (${if eq{$host_lookup_failed}{1}{failed}{deferred}})
+ condition = ${if and{{def:sender_host_address}{!def:sender_host_name}}\
+ {yes}{no}}
+
+ #############################################################################
+ # There are no checks on DNS "black" lists because the domains that contain
+ # these lists are changing all the time. You can find examples of
+ # how to use dnslists in /usr/share/doc/exim4-config/examples/acl
+ #############################################################################
+
+
+ # Perform greylisting on incoming messages from remote hosts.
+ # We do NOT greylist messages with no envelope sender, because that
+ # would conflict with remote hosts doing callback verifications, and we
+ # might not be able to send mail to such hosts for a while (until the
+ # callback attempt is no longer greylisted, and then some).
+ #
+ # We also check the local whitelist to avoid greylisting mail from
+ # hosts that are expected to forward mail here (such as backup MX hosts,
+ # list servers, etc).
+ #
+ # Because the recipient address has not yet been verified, we do so
+ # now and skip this statement for non-existing recipients. This is
+ # in order to allow for a 550 (reject) response below. If the delivery
+ # happens over a remote transport (such as "smtp"), recipient callout
+ # verification is performed, with the original sender intact.
+ #
+ defer
+ message = $sender_host_address is not yet authorized to deliver. \
+ Please try later.
+ log_message = greylisted.
+ !senders = :
+ !hosts = : +relay_from_hosts : \
+ ${if exists {/etc/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}\
+ {/etc/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}{}} : \
+ ${if exists {/var/lib/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}\
+ {/var/lib/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}{}}
+ !authenticated = *
+ !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ domains = +local_domains : +relay_to_domains : dsearch;/etc/exim4/virtual
+ verify = recipient/callout=20s,use_sender,defer_ok
+ condition = ${readsocket{/var/run/greylistd/socket}\
+ {--grey \
+ ${mask:$sender_host_address/24}} \
+# $sender_address \
+# $local_part@$domain}\
+ {5s}{}{false}}
+
+
+
+ # Accept if the address is in a local domain, but only if the recipient can
+ # be verified. Otherwise deny. The "endpass" line is the border between
+ # passing on to the next ACL statement (if tests above it fail) or denying
+ # access (if tests below it fail).
+ #
+ accept domains = +local_domains
+ endpass
+ message = unknown user
+ verify = recipient
+
+ accept domains = dsearch;/etc/exim4/virtual
+ endpass
+ message = unknown user
+ verify = recipient
+
+ # Accept if the address is in a domain for which we are relaying, but again,
+ # only if the recipient can be verified.
+ #
+ accept domains = +relay_to_domains
+ endpass
+ message = unrouteable address
+ verify = recipient
+
+ # If control reaches this point, the domain is neither in +local_domains
+ # nor in +relay_to_domains.
+
+ # Accept if the message comes from one of the hosts for which we are an
+ # outgoing relay. Recipient verification is omitted here, because in many
+ # cases the clients are dumb MUAs that don't cope well with SMTP error
+ # responses. If you are actually relaying out from MTAs, you should probably
+ # add recipient verification here.
+ #
+ accept hosts = +relay_from_hosts
+
+ # Accept if the message arrived over an authenticated connection, from
+ # any host. Again, these messages are usually from MUAs, so recipient
+ # verification is omitted.
+ #
+ accept authenticated = *
+
+ # Reaching the end of the ACL causes a "deny", but we might as well give
+ # an explicit message.
+ #
+ deny message = relay not permitted
+
+
+"""]]
+/etc/exim4/conf.d/acl/40_exim4-config_check_data
+[[!format txt """
+# 40_exim4-config_check_data
+
+acl_check_data:
+ # greylistd(8) configuration follows.
+ # This statement has been added by "greylistd-setup-exim4",
+ # and can be removed by running "greylistd-setup-exim4 remove".
+ # Any changes you make here will then be lost.
+ #
+ # Perform greylisting on incoming messages with no envelope sender here.
+ # We did not subject these to greylisting after RCPT TO:, because that
+ # would interfere with remote hosts doing sender callout verifications.
+ #
+ # Because there is no sender address, we supply only two data items:
+ # - The remote host address
+ # - The recipient address (normally, bounces have only one recipient)
+ #
+ # We also check the local whitelist to avoid greylisting mail from
+ # hosts that are expected to forward mail here (such as backup MX hosts,
+ # list servers, etc).
+ #
+ defer
+ message = $sender_host_address is not yet authorized to deliver. \
+ Please try later.
+ log_message = greylisted.
+ senders = :
+ !hosts = : +relay_from_hosts : \
+ ${if exists {/etc/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}\
+ {/etc/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}{}} : \
+ ${if exists {/var/lib/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}\
+ {/var/lib/greylistd/whitelist-hosts}{}}
+ !authenticated = *
+ !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ condition = ${readsocket{/var/run/greylistd/socket}\
+ {--grey \
+ ${mask:$sender_host_address/24}} \
+# $recipients}\
+ {5s}{}{false}}
+
+
+ # Deny unless the address list headers are syntactically correct.
+ #
+ # This is disabled by default because it might reject legitimate mail.
+ # If you want your system to insist on syntactically valid address
+ # headers, you might want to enable the following lines.
+ # deny message = Message headers fail syntax check
+ # !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ # !verify = header_syntax
+
+ # require that there is a verifiable sender address in at least
+ # one of the "Sender:", "Reply-To:", or "From:" header lines.
+ # deny message = No verifiable sender address in message headers
+ # !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny
+ # !verify = header_sender
+
+
+deny message = Serious MIME defect detected ($demime_reason)
+ demime = *
+ condition = ${if >{$demime_errorlevel}{2}{1}{0}}
+
+deny message = Blacklisted file extension detected
+ condition = ${if match \
+ {${lc:$mime_filename}} \
+ {\N(\.bat|\.com|\.exe|\.pif|\.prf|\.scr|\.vbs)$\N} \
+ {1}{0}}
+
+deny message = This message contains malware ($malware_name)
+ malware = *
+
+
+# Always put X-Spam-Score header in the message.
+# It looks like this:
+# X-Spam-Score: 6.6 (++++++)
+# When a MUA cannot match numbers, it can match for an
+# equivalent number of '+' signs.
+# The 'true' makes sure that the header is always put
+# in, no matter what the score.
+warn message = X-Spam-Score: $spam_score ($spam_bar)
+ condition = ${if <{$message_size}{300k}{1}{0}}
+ spam = spamassassin:true
+
+# Always put X-Spam-Report header in the message.
+# This is a multiline header that informs the user
+# which tests a message has "hit", and how much a
+# test has contributed to the score.
+warn message = X-Spam-Flag: YES
+ condition = ${if <{$message_size}{300k}{1}{0}}
+ spam = spamassassin:true
+ condition = ${if >{$spam_score_int}{30}{1}{0}}
+
+
+deny message = Spam score too high ($spam_score)
+ condition = ${if <{$message_size}{300k}{1}{0}}
+ spam = spamassassin:true
+ condition = ${if >{$spam_score_int}{100}{1}{0}}
+
+
+ # accept otherwise
+ accept
+"""]]
+
+
+ [[!tag CategoryCodeSnippets]] [[!tag CategoryTipsAndTricks]]
projects / debienna.git / commitdiff
